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Money can’t buy me trust:  
Evidence of external intervention crowding out process-based trust in alliances 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
In this study we investigate how external interventions shape process-based trust 
development in cross-border alliances. Specifically, we exploit a unique opportunity to 
observe the magnitude of external intervention through publicly available amounts of money 
given by the foreign, developed country partners’ government to support alliances with local, 
developing country partners. Applying motivation crowding theory to trust processes, we 
develop theoretical logic explaining how and under what conditions such third-party financial 
support negatively affects the local partner’s trust. Our assertions were tested using archival 
and survey data on 105 international strategic alliances. We find that amount of support is 
detrimental to local partner trust but that the negative relationship can be dampened via 
interaction between partners and agreement throughout these interactions. This shows a need 
for partners to think through trust development consequences of external interventions during 
the setting up of their alliances, in order to be able to act in a manner which promotes trust. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The proliferation of international strategic alliances (ISAs) has generated much debate. ISAs 
are relatively enduring cooperative arrangements that use resources of independent firms, 
based in different countries, for the joint accomplishment of individual objectives (Robson, 
Katsikeas and Bello, 2008). Alliances offer potential benefits to firms but often fail to meet 
set objectives (Lavie, Haunschild and Khanna, 2012). In response, a major stream of work on 
ISA performance has emerged. Recent reviews show not only that trust is the performance 
driver most often tested (Christoffersen, 2013), but also that it is reliable in its influence 
(Krishnan, Geyskens and Steenkamp, 2015). Trust improves alliance outcomes as it lowers 
transaction costs, leads to faster decisions, and facilitates investment in relationship-specific 
assets (Heidl, Steensma and Phelps, 2014; Thorgren and Wincent, 2011). 
The thrust of trust development research is guided by the two opposing logics of 
economics and embeddedness (Lado, Dant and Tekleab, 2008; Lui and Ngo, 2012). First, 
trust may be produced through alignment of partners’ economic incentives. Firms may 
behave in a trustworthy manner due to credible commitments they have made (Katsikeas, 
Skarmeas and Bello, 2009). Second, the embeddedness view eschews cost–benefit 
calculations in favor of noncalculative aspects of exchange. When transactions are embedded 
within social relationships, trust emerges from the frequency and intensity of interactions 
between the partner firms’ personnel (McEvily and Marcus, 2005). 
Dyer and Chu’s (2000) seminal study on trust development within international 
automaker–supplier relationships emphasized process-based trust as a neglected, third way to 
generate trust. Process-based trust development concerns institutionalized processes for fairly 
and reliably dealing with a partner firm (Zucker, 1986; Zaheer, McEvily and Perrone, 1998). 
Dyer and Chu (2000) identified that processes for selecting partners and responding to their 
problems were better predictors of trustworthiness than economic and embeddedness drivers. 
4 
 
Nonetheless, these authors’ later retrospective (2011, p. 34) suggested: “…we have not seen 
much follow-up research … on our notion of process-based trust.” 
Research on process-based trust development has argued that alliance partners should 
deploy stable and enduring, institutionalized exchange processes (Zaheer et al., 1998). 
Indeed, experienced partners often formalize procedural frameworks and respective 
obligations in their alliances (Mayer and Teece, 2008). External intervention, however, can 
affect partner interactions (Hitt et al., 2004; Abdi and Aulakh, 2012). For instance, partner 
firms’ cross-border alliance processes may be rendered less reliable and more uncertain 
through state regulator interventions (Merchant and Schendel, 2000). Similarly, high-
technology alliances usually involve sub-contractors and other external parties (Tiwana, 
2008), whose work might shape what the main partners deem to be fair and reliable processes 
for interactions. Within systems involving interventions by third-parties external to the ISA 
partnership, trust based on fair processes is more difficult to deploy. The evident gap in 
knowledge concerning such process complexities prompts our study. 
Our study contributes to the alliance management literature in three ways. First, while 
studies on process-based trust have established its criticality for effective cross-border 
alliances (Dyer and Chu, 2011), they are silent as to the deleterious effect of external 
intervention on such trust building. This is the first study to consider how external 
intervention undermines activities required to build generalized expectations and predictions 
concerning trust in ISAs. We exploit a novel opportunity to observe external intervention 
magnitude through publicly available amounts of money given to support alliances, and use 
this opportunity to examine how and under which conditions the specific influence alters trust 
perceptions. We examine a situation in which the start-up of ISAs between foreign 
(developed country) and local (developing country) partners is supported financially in a 
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development aid program by the foreign firm’s government via reimbursements of some of 
the costs associated with particular activities. 
Second, prior research (e.g., Hu and Chen, 1996) has revealed circumstances wherein 
government economic incentives do not yield superior alliance outcomes. Our study goes one 
step further in theorizing that increasing amounts of support can be detrimental to trust 
development. Trust processes involve incremental activities building toward long-term 
exchange outcomes. By extending motivation crowding theory (e.g., Deci, Koestner and 
Ryan, 1999) to alliances, we argue that financial support crowds out the motivation to engage 
in such processes. As per theory suggesting trust expectations evolve through mutually 
satisfying interactions (Rempel, Holmes and Zanna, 1985), we also assert that the crowding 
out effect can be dampened through interaction of the partners in early strategic processes of 
the alliance and their level of agreement during such interaction. 
Third, our approach to theorizing trust demonstrates how researchers can respond to 
Zhong et al.’s (2014) call for depth and specificity in hypotheses on interorganizational trust 
development. We do so by recognizing that organizations cooperate via managerial boundary 
spanners and invoking psychological literature on motivation crowding and trust. We present 
results specific to financial support to alliances and local partner trust but forcefully 
demonstrate a more general point being that process-based trust development can be 
disrupted. We identified a pertinent external intervention—the inflow of financial support—
which most rational managers would welcome, and show that the complexities of process-
based trust can in fact make it detrimental.  
 
THEORY AND HYPOTHESES 
Trust processes 
6 
 
As trust has been addressed within different disciplines, including economics, psychology, 
and sociology (Rousseau et al., 1998), it is not surprising that different conceptions of the 
phenomenon have been advanced. However, “nearly all conceptions begin with the 
recognition that, whatever else it may encompass, trust is fundamentally a psychological state 
characterized by several components, the most important of which is some sort of positive 
expectation regarding others’ behavior” (Kramer and Lewicki, 2010, p. 247). Many 
definitions contain some reference to willingness to be vulnerable (Kramer and Lewicki, 
2010). As such, we perceive trust as “willingness of a party to be vulnerable to the actions of 
another party based on the expectation that the other will perform a particular action 
important to the trustor, irrespective of the ability to monitor or control that other party” 
(Mayer, Davis and Schoorman, 1995, p. 712). In principle, trust is a psychological state 
offering a representation of how individuals understand their relationship with another party 
in situations that involve vulnerability (Dirks and Ferrin, 2001). In organizational settings, 
including alliances, the construct has been widened to apply it more generally to teams of 
managerial boundary spanners. 
The literature presents different views on interorganizational trust developments. In an 
early economics-based perspective, this happens through alignment of incentives in the form 
of mutual and voluntary hostage giving/taking, functioning as credible commitments to the 
partnership (Katsikeas et al., 2009). Almost simultaneous research from the sociological 
perspective presented transactions as embedded in rich social contexts (Lui and Ngo, 2012), 
in which the risk of social sanctions bars opportunism of the boundary spanners representing 
the partners (Dyer and Chu, 2000). 
Dyer and Chu (2000), building on Zucker (1986) and Zaheer et al. (1998), among others, 
subsequently established the process-based perspective; that interorganizational trust 
develops through consistency of firms’ actions. In comparison, trust development based on 
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the embeddedness perspective depends on socially meaningful personal interactions, while 
from the economic perspective trust depends on alignment of partners’ economic incentives. 
Dyer and Chu (2000) unveiled that Japanese automakers build trust with US suppliers based 
on fair and reliable actions. These authors found that the consistent behavior of partner firms 
(process-based perspective), rather than shared social values (embeddedness perspective) or 
shared equity interests (economic perspective), better explained trust development. 
Dyer and Chu’s (2000) process-based perspective aligns with psychological views on trust 
development between individuals. For instance, Rempel et al. (1985, p. 96) noted that “trust 
evolves through mutually satisfying interactions”. As such, the anteceding condition for trust 
is predictability of a partner’s behavior as shaped by the consistency of their behaviors and an 
understanding of the reward contingencies underlying potential actions in the ISA. 
Moreover, the notion of institutionalized processes for fairly and reliably dealing with a 
partner firm resonates with Child and Mollering’s (2003) active trust. These authors suggest 
that without prior experiences of working with a partner from an emerging market, a 
developed country partner must actively work on trust by introducing its own micro-
institutionalization in the form of practices that establish predictability and reliability (Child 
and Mollering 2003). This is needed as they face underdeveloped institutions and lack pre-
existing embedded relationships (e.g., guanxi) that can substitute for institutional norms.  
We advance knowledge by suggesting how the motivation to engage in processes of 
mutually satisfying interactions can be dampened by external intervention via financial 
support. This is the main effect considered below. Further, we examine how partner 
interaction during early activities aimed at developing alliance strategic processes and 
performing those interactions without disagreement can shield against the deleterious effect 
of external intervention, moderating the main effect. 
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Amount of support and trust 
Main effect. According to process-based logic, firms’ processes for fairly and reliably 
dealing with a partner organization influence trust development. We argue that in the 
presence of high levels of financial support, these processes will not be approached in the 
same manner as they are for low levels of support. Substantial work in psychology asserts 
that extrinsic rewards crowd out intrinsic motivation, meaning that individuals do less of 
activities they find interesting and purposeful without extrinsic rewards (Deci, 1975). The 
effect arises as individuals will eventually attribute any interest in the activity to the reward, 
rather than to the original intrinsic motivation (Lepper, Greene and Nisbett, 1973). 
Deci et al. (1999, p. 627) demonstrated in their meta-analysis of motivational approaches 
that crowding out effects are particularly strong when rewards are: 1) tangible (vs. verbal); 2) 
expected (vs. unexpected); and 3) contingent upon task-completion (vs. engagement 
contingent, performance contingent, and task non-contingent). Although the ISA setting is 
organizational rather than personal, we assume that alliance managers are individuals who in 
given situations deal with organizational issues as if they were personal. We draw the parallel 
that in alliances supported by the focal development aid program there are tangible rewards in 
the form of financial support (cf. 1 above). The project plan specificies exactly how much 
support each activity gives rise to making rewards higly expected (cf. 2 above). Finally, the 
project plan makes rewards contingent upon task completion (cf. 3 above). We therefore 
expect a negative impact of financial support (extrinsic motivation) on the activities normally 
performed to develop the relationship (intrinsic motivation). 
Moreover, we argue that the crowding out of intrinsic motivation will decrease trust 
specifically, because the free-choice activities that would be performed to develop the ISA 
and that produce increases in trust between parties, are produced through an accumulation of 
prior interactions that are judged by the parties as being efficient and equitable (Ring and Van 
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de Ven, 1994). Accumulation of such interactions is less likely to take place when increasing 
financial support distorts the intrinsic motivation of the alliance partners to work normally to 
build their relationship. Partners instead focus on the short-term financial benefits that can be 
obtained from performing supported activities. 
Cross-border alliances, including those of the focal development aid program, generally 
involve partners with a limited (if any) history of cooperation. In the absence of prior 
exchanges between two partners, trust foundations stemming from the accumulation of 
consistent behaviors would not exist. The emergence of process-based trust would rely upon 
the partners being active rather than passive from the outset of the alliance, and being free to 
set standardized processes that are diagnostic of trust and build familiarity and predictability 
in their interactions (Child and Mollering, 2003).  
Based on motivation crowding theory, we posit that the hidden costs of reward (i.e., low 
trust) surface when the external intervention (i.e., amount of support) reduces managers’ 
intrinsic incentives to act freely across alliance development stages (cf. Frey, 1997). In the 
focal development aid program, activities associated with negotiations, formation, and 
growth of the ISAs are reimbursed, impeding partners’ reliance on micro-institutions to 
import standardized and consistent processes during these stages. Hence, extrinsic motivation 
is present during alliance stages where, under normal circumstances, partners’ trust would 
develop incrementally (Inkpen and Currall, 1998). 
Not only do the funded activities come at the expense of the ISA partners’ efforts to 
actively work on trust, anecdotal evidence also suggests that they may disagree and haggle 
over the use of funds. According to our prestudy interviews with local and foreign partners as 
well as aid program representatives, the local partner typically wants support to finance 
equipment for themselves, while the foreign partner typically wants support to finance their 
training of the local partner. Such tensions provide an incentive for the partners to withhold 
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information or even misinform one another. Regardless of whether the partners negotiate 
selfishly, the mere possibility induces uncertainty, which decreases their willingness to put 
themselves at risk. This is expressed precisely by Lindskold (1978, p. 773) who noted that 
“[a] person will be trusted if he appears nonmanipulative. If he is attempting to convince the 
perceiver to perform an act or espouse a belief and it appears that he is in a position to gain as 
a result, he will be less trusted than if his outcomes are apparently unconnected to the 
perceiver’s acts or beliefs”. With increasing amounts of support there is more at stake and the 
willingness to be vulnerable to the actions of the partner will naturally decrease  
As partners typically find their own claims for funds fair, one or both of them may 
conclude that funds are being distributed unfairly. This issue of distributive fairness—
referring to whether the distribution of outcomes and inputs of a given process is fair 
(Colquitt et al., 2001)—is salient to the idea of fairly and reliably dealing with the 
counterpart within the process-based view of trust (Zucker, 1986). In this context, Robson et 
al. (2008) found that distributive fairness is a prerequisite for positive expectations that serve 
as the basis for trust in cross-border alliances. While distributive fairness does not in itself 
relate to the magnitude of the rewards and costs to be distributed, it is logical that distributive 
unfairness becomes of greater concern as the magnitude of costs and benefits increases. 
The argumentation above implies that with increasing amounts of support: (1) intrinsic 
motivation to perform activities to develop the alliance will be crowded out and replaced by 
extrinsic motivation to think up activities that merit financial support; and (2) those activities 
that are crowded out are exactly those activities that develop trust and activities that replace 
them are those that obstruct trust. Activities that are judged by the parties as being efficient 
and equitable are replaced with others that entail more self-serving behavior. Using the words 
of psychologists researching trust in close relationships, the partners do not show “a 
11 
 
willingness to put [themselves] at risk…. sacrificing present rewards for future gains” 
(Rempel et al., 1985, p. 96). 
While we expect that amount of support will be negatively associated with the partners’ 
trust in each other, our hypotheses focus on the local (developing country) partner’s trust in 
the foreign (developed country) partner. We posit that trust issues are particularly salient to 
the local partner. The logic stems from pre-study interviews with local as well as foreign 
partners and concurs with Kramer (1996), who observed that in relationships between 
graduate students and their faculty advisors, trust concerns are more apparent to students. 
These actors code more transactions as diagnostic of trustworthiness and more easily 
remember instances of trust violation. Kramer attributed this difference to the greater 
dependency and vulnerability of students. In ISAs the local, developing country partner 
supposedly acts as a student learning from the foreign, developed country partner and has a 
student-like dependency and vulnerability. By contrast, the foreign partner receives 
reimbursements for their knowledge, similar to the way faculty advisors receive 
reimbursements for transferring knowledge to students. We thus propose that: 
HYPOTHESIS 1.  Amount of support is negatively associated with local partner trust. 
 
Moderation effects. The above view implied that support is most likely to distort intrinsic 
motivation in alliance relationships in which the initial conditions for trust are poor. 
Accordingly, we consider the possibility that our main effect is moderated by the extent to 
which the relationship provides early opportunities for trust to develop. Specifically, we are 
inspired by Ring and Van de Ven’s (1994, p. 101) notion that trust is “produced through an 
accumulation of prior interactions that were judged by the parties as being efficient and 
equitable”. Such logic is in line with trust psychologists’ (e.g., Rempel et al., 1985, p. 96) 
observations that, in close relationships, “trust evolves through mutually satisfying 
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interactions”. Both perspectives highlight the importance of an accumulation of interactions 
as well as some positive sentiment of mutual satisfaction or efficiency and equitability arising 
from these interactions. This suggests two aspects potentially moderating the negative impact 
of financial support on trust. The first is interaction, which we extend beyond previously used 
frequency of interaction (e.g., McAllister, 1995) by referring instead to its substance. As 
such, we define interaction as the extent to which alliance partners have participated jointly in 
early activities aimed at developing the alliance business case. The second is agreement, 
which, inspired by the literature on conflict, we define as absence of professional 
disagreement about the alliance task and processes (Jehn and Mannix, 2001). 
As trust requires an assessment of the partner firm’s credibility and benevolence, the 
perceiver must have information about the counterpart’s past behavior. “Repeated interaction 
enables the party to interpret prior outcomes better, providing a basis for assessing 
predictability” (Doney and Cannon, 1997, p. 37). This assertion is supported by 
psychologists’ work on trust in close relationships suggesting that “such encounters give 
opportunities for shifting the focus from individual assessments of specific behaviors to 
overall evaluation of the qualities attributable to the partner” (Rempel et al., 1985, p. 96). We 
previously argued that partners can lack an understanding of each other’s contributions, 
which gives rise to perceived distributive unfairness and low levels of trust (Robson et al., 
2008). With a better understanding of each other’s meaningful contributions, partners in an 
exchange situation will be more likely to perceive distribution as fair (Adams, 1965). To this 
point, interactions during early strategic activities of the alliance will increase understanding 
and the sense of joint contributions. Trust depends on attributions concerning the motives for 
others’ ongoing behavior that can be attributed confidently as a result of quality, formative 
interactions (Lewis and Weigert, 1985). 
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We therefore propose that partners that have interacted substantively within early strategy-
making processes of the ISA will focus less on assessing individual actions in relation to the 
financial support provided. They will instead focus on overall evaluation of the qualities 
attributable to the partner and, thus, be less inclined to interpret behaviors as motivated by the 
extrinsic motivation of securing external support rather than intrinsic motivation of 
developing the alliance business. When partners have interacted substantively within early 
strategy-making processes of the ISA, this experience will militate against the negative 
influence support can have on trust development. Accordingly: 
HYPOTHESIS 2.  Interaction positively moderates the association between amount of 
support and local partner trust. 
 
We expect that a situation characterized by disagreements about alliance tasks and 
processes (Jehn and Mannix, 2001) would give rise to uncertainty about the future course of 
the alliance and make partners alert to the possibility of the other serving own needs. 
Investigating the relationship between suspicion and trust, Fein and Hilton (1994, p. 167) 
found that “suspicion may cause perceivers to see the actor in a more negative light, even if 
the perceivers are not convinced that the actor’s behavior was indeed affected by ulterior 
motives”. The natural response to suspicion is competition. Once one partner engages in 
competitive actions, tensions deepen, giving rise to an escalating cycle of competition (Le 
Roy and Fernandez, 2015). Thus, disagreement at a professional level may give rise to an 
environment in which trust development faces less than stable conditions. Conversely, 
agreement about the course of the alliance business may produce positive sentiments of 
mutual satisfaction (Rempel et al., 1985) and efficiency and equitability (Ring and Van de 
Ven, 1994). Such sentiments are more likely if partners have a shared and enduring view on 
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how the alliance work should proceed, in which case each partner would have positive 
sentiments about not only its own role and outcomes but also those of the counterpart. 
We thus posit that partners that have achieved a high level of professional agreement 
about alliance tasks and processes are relatively unlikely to be suspicious about the 
motivations of each other when it comes to negotiations about financial support; which limits 
the negative effect of support on trust. If, on the other hand, partners do not agree on the 
overall course of the alliance, actions in relation to the financial support are likely to be 
interpreted suspiciously; and, therefore, the negative effect of support on trust would be 
unconstrained. As such: 
HYPOTHESIS 3.  Agreement positively moderates the association between amount of 
support and local partner trust. 
 
METHODOLOGY 
Research context and data 
We study alliances supported by Danida (Danish International Development Agency) through 
its Business-to-Business (B2B) Program. The program aim is to promote long-term, 
commercially viable ISAs between firms in Danida’s program countries and Danish firms in 
order to ultimately strengthen local business development. The B2B Program funds up to 90 
percent of costs for specific activities in three phases of ISA development: contact phase, or 
studying the possibilities of a partnership (max. support = EUR 17,000 approx.); pilot phase, 
or forming the partnership (max. support = EUR 134,000 approx.); and project phase, or 
deepening of the partnership (max. support = EUR 671,000 approx.) (Danida, 2010). 
Our use of the program is appropriate for three reasons. First, it provides a unique chance 
to study the relationship between an external intervention and trust, using publicly available 
information on the amount of support; information which is rarely revealed under other 
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circumstances. Second, since a principle of the program is that the local, developing country 
partners are supposed to learn from the Danish partners, the data allow us to study a student–
teacher type of relationship similar to that studied by Kramer (1996); the student role of the 
local firm makes that partner particularly attentive to trust issues in the sense that this partner 
more easily remembers instances of trust violation. Third, the program has been applied in 23 
developing and emerging economies and a diverse set of industries, enabling us to infer that 
results are not a function of country or industry idiosyncrasies. 
In order to gain a better understanding of the research setting and issues, the lead author 
conducted 22 prestudy interviews. These interviews―with three Danida representatives, and 
ten foreign partner and nine local partner representatives, together spanning many industry 
and country settings―were conducted at the offices of the interviewee and lasted between 
one and two hours. Interviewees were encouraged to discuss the nature of support and its 
impact on alliance relationship processes. All interviews were recorded. 
The prestudy interviews broadly supported our framing of financial support crowding out 
process-based trust development. In referring to the partner firm, one interviewee noted: 
“They have no intention of actually doing what is in the description. They just want to see 
how much money they can get out of Danida.” Another revealed: “It would have been easier 
if there had been no support because the support hinders the flexibility. We would have been 
more successful, if we had not had that money. Because you have had that money, you have 
been tied to doing things in one specific way.” 
We started data collection by identifying ISAs through the website of Danida. In this, we 
focused on the Danish firms rather than on local partners from the many different countries 
covered by the B2B Program. Methodological contributions to cross-cultural research (e.g., 
Harkness, Van de Vijver and Mohler, 2003) and trust research (e.g., Welter and Alex, 2012) 
caution against using respondents with different cultural backgrounds, as doing so can give 
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rise to culture-driven variation in the measures that distorts results. We avoid such variation 
by using respondents from only one country. A total of 347 Danish firms were identified. 
Following guidelines on data collection procedures (Huber and Power, 1985; Dillman, 
2000), we contacted the firms prior to launching the survey to identify the manager most 
knowledgeable about the relevant issues. We spoke to this manager to motivate cooperation 
by explaining how the research could be relevant to his or her firm. In total, 199 agreed to 
receive an email invitation to participate in the survey. We followed up with emails and 
ultimately letters to ensure that the invitation had reached the relevant person and to remind 
that person of the survey. After the final round of reminders, 136 respondents had answered 
the questionnaire. We thus achieved a response rate of 68 percent of firms to which the 
questionnaire had been administered. 
In a post hoc check, we excluded 18 managers who answered that they had not been 
“personally involved” with the ISA since its inception. Such involvement was necessary for 
obtaining valid responses for the moderator variables interaction and agreement, particularly. 
We dealt with missing observations through list-wise deletion and lost six more, reaching 105 
observations that could be used in the statistical analyses. These pertained to ISAs in 17 of 
the 23 countries originally covered by the program: Vietnam 27, Egypt 12, Bangladesh 11, 
Ghana 9, Uganda 8, South Africa 5, Bolivia 4, India 4, Zimbabwe 4, Malaysia 4, 
Mozambique 4, Kenya 3, Tanzania 3, Thailand 3, China 2, Nepal 1, and Zambia 1. 
While the high response rate serves to lower the risk of nonresponse bias, we tested for 
such bias in two ways. First, we used Armstrong and Overton’s (1977) procedure, which is 
based on the assumption that subjects who respond less readily (i.e., late respondents) are 
more like nonrespondents. We split the sample in half based on response time and performed 
t-tests for differences between the two samples’ means across the items tapping the 
hypothesized and control variables. None of the differences was significant (at p < .05). 
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Second, we compared our sample ISAs with a group of 70 randomly selected (one in three of 
the 211) nonrespondents in terms of the key variable, amount of support, and found no 
significant difference. Thus, nonresponse bias is not a problem in this research. 
 
Measures 
Hypothesized variables.  Whereas amount of support was an exact figure in Danish Krone 
found in archival information produced by Danida, measures for local partner trust, 
interaction, and agreement had to be collected through questionnaire items (see Appendix). 
The survey questions were developed initially on the basis of a thorough review of the 
literature, and were then scrutinized by three academic subject experts as well as by a senior 
Danida administrator. On the basis of their comments, we reworded questions or terms that 
were considered ambiguous. Next, the adapted version was tested on ten potential 
respondents (i.e., Danish alliance managers). This last step resulted in only minor revisions to 
the questions. 
Local partner trust was assessed by the foreign (Danish) partner who was asked to report 
their perception of the local partner’s trust in the foreign partner. This approach assumes that 
the foreign partner’s assessment of local partner trust would be affected by actual trust 
behaviors of the local partner, as the integrative nature of alliance work gives rise to partners 
continuously signaling trust to their counterparts (Krishnan et al., 2015). This is in line with 
the alliance literature, where trust measures frequently rely on a single informant to comment 
on others’ trust. For instance, in Fang et al. (2008) a joint venture manager assesses 1) the 
trust between him/her and the other partner’s representative in the joint venture management 
team; 2) the trust between his/her employer and the other parent company; and 3) his/her 
employer’s trust in him/her. Further, the approach is in line with longstanding trust research 
in social psychology where partner-reported measures have been employed on the grounds 
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that: partners signal their trust through behaviors during particularly intense interactions (e.g., 
conflict discussions) (Gonzaga et al., 2001); and self-reported measurement of own trust in 
others is a poor reflection of actual trust (Glaeser et al., 2000).1 
As a starting point for the development of the local partner trust scale, we identified 
measures used in the alliance literature, which revealed a diversity of approaches. 
Nonetheless, we found Muthusamy, White, and Carr’s (2007) trust scale particularly 
appealing for two reasons. First, the measure captures one partner’s trust in the other, rather 
than trust between the alliance partners. Second, it encompasses trust’s multifaceted nature by 
referring to ability-, benevolence-, and integrity-based dimensions of trust as defined by 
Mayer et al. (1995). This quality is attractive given that McEvily and Tortoriello (2011, p. 
24) noted in their review of the trust literature that one of the few aspects on which 
organizational scholars agree concerns the definition of trust outlined by Mayer et al.’s 
(1995) conceptualization. Consequently, based on Muthusamy et al. (2007) and, in turn, 
Mayer et al. (1995), our three-item trust measure reflects the multifaceted nature by including 
one item relating to each facet. 
We sought to obtain a measure of the extent and substance of interaction between the 
partners rather than tap the relational quality of interaction. As such, we avoided asking about 
joint participation, mutual involvement, cooperation, or other phenomena with relational 
connotations. Our measure of interaction is based on the interaction term of the two partners’ 
participation in initial alliance strategy-making process. First, we asked three questions about 
local partner participation in each of three early strategic activities as well as three questions 
about foreign partner participation in the same activities. We then calculated an interaction 
item for each of the three activities by multiplying the two partners’ participation scores, 
                                                          
1 See, for instance, Glaeser et al. (2000, p. 826), who compared self-reported trust and trust behaviors in an experimental setting and found 
that of “twelve different attitudinal measures, all but two have no statistically signiﬁcant covariation with the actual amount of trust in [their] 
experiment”. 
19 
 
since the product term reflects the extent of simultaneous participation and thus interaction 
through the given activity (Kim and Hsieh, 2003). To capture agreement, we reversed Jehn 
and Mannix’s (2001) disagreement measure tapping task, process, and relationship conflict. 
For present purposes, we used three items relating to whether there had been task and process 
conflict. We did not employ items tapping relationship conflict as we sought to capture 
professional rather than personal or emotional opinions of the partners. 
Control variables.  The survey included questions to tap several differences between the 
ISAs in order to generate suitable variables that control for partnership characteristics 
potentially affecting the amount of support and/or local partner trust. To identify potential 
differences, we scrutinized all available material about the aid program and employed our 
prestudy interviews. Due to the large number of controls, individual theoretical rationales for 
including each are not reported here. Measures of the controls are reported in the Appendix. 
One group of controls are prealliance, intrapartner variables including local partner size, 
foreign partner size, local partner international experience, local partner alliance 
experience, foreign partner international experience, and foreign partner alliance 
experience. A second group of controls are prealliance, interpartner variables that potentially 
reflect fit: prior experience working together, vertical relatedness, horizontal relatedness, 
resource similarity, and cultural similarity. Third are variables focusing on the initial set-up 
of the alliance, including one for equity alliance (dummy) and four tapping the business 
model (local to foreign sales, foreign to local sales, joint selling in local market, and joint 
selling in non-local market). Finally, we included extra variables relating to initial 
interpartner dealings: individual local partner participation and foreign partner participation, 
as well as aid agency participation (i.e., active participation of Danida in the ISA).  
 
Common method variance 
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Common method variance (CMV) concerns in the study are reduced as the main antecedent 
variable, amount of support, is objectively measured. Nevertheless, since the moderator and 
dependent variables were measured in the key informant survey, we employed procedural 
remedies recommended by Podsakoff et al. (2003) to lessen CMV bias. First, we carefully 
developed and pretested individual items to avoid item ambiguity that can stimulate CMV. 
Second, we attempted to reduce respondents’ motivation to edit their responses to be more 
socially desirable by promising anonymity and urging them to submit honest answers, or 
refrain from answering if questions were deemed too sensitive. Third, the survey included 
several questions not relevant for this study, making it difficult for respondents to predict 
relationships between predictor and criterion variables and edit their responses accordingly. 
 
ANALYSIS AND RESULTS 
Measure validation 
Before testing the hypotheses, we evaluated the multi-item measures by including all the 
assumed constructs in a measurement model to be tested using Generalized Least-Squares 
estimation in the SAS procedure Proc Calis. Table 1 reports standardized loadings and 
average variance extracted (AVE) and composite reliability scores for each multi-item 
variable. The fit indices generally show an acceptable fit (χ2(239) = 270, p > 0.05; RMSEA = 
0.03; NNFI = 0.89), all loadings are high and significant (p < 0.01) and all the measures’ 
AVEs are well above the recommended 50 percent threshold (Fornell and Larcker, 1981). 
Further, composite reliability for all measures is well above 0.7. The measurement model 
results thus offer evidence of convergent validity. 
Table 1 goes about here 
In order to assess discriminant validity for each multi-item variable, we squared its 
correlations with the other multi-item variables and compared these against the relevant 
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AVEs. All squared correlations were considerably below the AVEs, which suggests the 
measures reflect different constructs (Fornell and Larcker, 1981). We then performed 
Harman’s single-factor test using a CFA procedure to appraise the level of CMV in the data. 
The fit indices show a very poor fit of this model to the data (χ2(274) = 1413, p < 0.0001; 
RMSEA = 0.20; NNFI = 0.21), while the AVE for this latent variable is at 15 percent, which 
is far below the lowest AVE of the individual multi-item measures. Hence, CMV is not a 
dominant cause of our survey data pattern (Korsgaard and Roberson, 1995, Podsakoff et al., 
2003). Moreover, the likelihood of our hypothesis tests, specifically, being affected by such 
bias is very low as each uses archival and survey data. 
 
Hypothesis testing 
Having validated the multi-item measures, we averaged the items for each of the variables to 
enable hypothesis testing in a hierarchical moderated regression setting. The combination of 
three conditions makes hierarchical moderated regression more appropriate than structural 
equation modeling (SEM) and allied techniques. First, the complexity of the empirical model, 
which includes numerous control variables, militates against analytical procedures that 
require an appropriate ratio of sample size to the number of parameters estimated (Bentler 
and Chou, 1987). Second, our theoretical model involves neither several dependent variables 
nor mediating variables, but rather moderation, which makes it amenable for testing in a 
hierarchical moderated regression setting. Third, regression procedures can be used to control 
for selectivity bias; in this case, the possibility that amount of support is a choice variable that 
is assigned systematically by managers based on alliance characteristics. Table 2 displays the 
descriptive statistics and correlations for all variables used in our regression analyses. 
Table 2 goes about here 
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Table 3 shows the results of hypothesis testing via hierarchical moderated regression 
models. A mean-centering technique was used to avoid variance inflation. Indeed, none of the 
variance inflation factor estimates for the effects in the regression models reached 2; they are 
well below the recommended ceiling of 10 (Kutner, Nachtsheim and Neter, 2004). The 
results suggest the main effect of the amount of support on local partner trust is negative 
(Model b: βAmount of support = -0.23, t = -2.65, p < 0.01, and Model c: βAmount of support = -0.32, t = 
-3.48, p < 0.01). As such, Hypothesis 1 is supported. Model c also shows that this 
relationship is positively moderated by interaction (βAmount of support * interaction =0.23, t = 2.21, p 
< 0.05) and agreement (βAmount of support * agreement = 0.22, t = 2.31, p < 0.05), in support of 
Hypothesis 2 and Hypothesis 3, respectively. Figure 1 presents the plots of these interactions 
(Aiken and West, 1991). Together, the three exogenous study variables contribute well in 
terms of explaining variation in local partner trust. 
Of the 21 control variables, 7 are significant at the p = 0.10 significance level or lower in 
model c. Foreign partner size, local partner alliance experience, and aid agency participation 
are negatively related to local partner trust, whereas local partner participation, foreign 
partner participation, interaction, and prior experience working with each other are positively 
related to local partner trust. 
Table 3 and Figure 1 go about here 
 
Robustness check 
We theorize that the amount of support is independent of other characteristics of partnerships 
that may also affect trust. Nevertheless, the possibility exists that the amount of support is 
assigned systematically based on characteristics that also affect trust (e.g., size or 
relatedness). Hence the amount of support might represent a choice variable not randomly 
assigned across the sample. Following Garen’s (1984) approach for selectivity-bias 
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correction with a continuous choice variable, we first constructed a selectivity-correction 
term from an amount of support regression equation and, in a second stage, included the 
correction term in the local partner trust equation.  
In the first-stage model, we used all control variables that could be considered to affect 
allocation of support; that is, prealliance, intrapartner variables (local partner size, foreign 
partner size, local partner international experience, local partner alliance experience, foreign 
partner international experience and foreign partner alliance experience), prealliance, 
interpartner variables (prior experience working together, vertical relatedness, horizontal 
relatedness, resource similarity, and cultural similarity), and variables related to the initial 
set-up of the alliance and its strategy (equity alliance, local to foreign sales, foreign to local 
sales, joint selling in local market, and joint selling in non-local market). In the second stage 
we used our hypothesized variables along with the remaining control variables (local partner 
participation and foreign partner participation, as well as aid agency participation). Following 
Garen (1984) we also included the residuals from the first-stage model as well as the 
residuals multiplied by the amount of support.  
Table 4 shows the result of this robustness test. The F-value (0.95) and adjusted R2 (-0.01) 
of the first-stage model reveals that amount of support certainly did not seem to be explained 
by the suggested variables. This indicates that our original analysis is robust. What is more, 
the second-stage model suggests that the hypothesized variables were significant and in line 
with our expectations (βAmount of support = -0. 39, t = -1.72, p < 0.10; βAmount of support * interaction 
=0.19, t = 2.21, p < 0.05; βAmount of support * agreement = 0.27, t = 2.59, p < 0.05). The terms 
involving the residuals from the first-stage model were non-significant (βresiduals = 0.05, t = 
0.20, p > 0.10 and βresiduals * amount of support = 0.00, t =0.03, p > 0.10), suggesting unobserved 
factors in the first-stage model of support allocation have no significant effects on the 
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support–trust relationship. Therefore, self-selection does not appear to be a problem in testing 
the study hypotheses. 
Table 4 goes about here 
 
DISCUSSION 
The process-based perspective of trust development (e.g., Zucker, 1986) asserts the 
importance of partner firms interacting through fair and reliable processes. The premise of 
this study is that processes may be rendered less fair and reliable by a particular external 
intervention—namely, a governmental sponsor’s financial support. We draw on motivation 
crowding theory to predict that the prospect of support crowds out free-choice activities that 
would normally be performed to develop the alliance. Indeed, the crowded out activities are 
replaced by others that entail more self-serving behavior in haggling over support. Our results 
confirm that amount of support is negatively associated with local partner trust. We also 
observe that partners interacting via joint participation in the early phases of their alliance can 
reduce the negative effect of amount of support on local partner trust. Similarly, we find that 
if partners achieved professional agreement in setting up the alliance, trust is also less likely 
to be negatively affected by the financial support. 
The study’s contribution to knowledge is threefold. First, the vast majority of trust 
development studies are guided by the logics of aligning alliance partners’ economic 
incentives or embedding their exchanges within relationship-rich settings (Lui and Ngo, 
2012). Although the relatively few studies on process-based trust (e.g., Child and Mollering, 
2003; Dyer and Chu, 2011) have established its importance for building effective cross-
border alliances—even between partners with limited cooperative history—the dampening 
effects of external intervention on such trust are unknown. Our study is the first to consider 
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how external intervention undermines partners’ efforts to activate trust by introducing 
practices that build stable expectations and predictions in their alliance interactions. 
Second, the study is novel in extending tenets of motivation crowding theory (e.g., Deci et 
al., 1999) to the alliance context. The findings broadly support our assertions that intrinsic 
motivation to perform activities to develop the alliance will be crowded out and replaced by 
extrinsic motivation to think up activities that merit financial support; and that crowded out 
activities are exactly those activities that build trust, while activities replacing them 
undermine trust. Our theorization takes into account that support is more likely to diminish 
intrinsic motivation in an alliance relationship in which the conditions for trust generally are 
poor (i.e., low interaction and agreement). 
Third, our approach to theorizing trust demonstrates how researchers can add depth and 
specificity to hypotheses on trust development. In this context, Zhong et al. (2014) theorized 
that the duration of an alliance is related to trust development but also observed that 
unobserved moderators potentially underlie the association. Our study echoes that deeper 
insights can be surfaced by considering that organizations consist of individuals and 
supplementing theories on interorganizational trust development with theories about 
individuals and their motivations and ensuing reactions. This point is illustrated by the 
combination of motivation crowding theory and theory on interpersonal trust leading to 
conditional hypotheses and findings. 
 
POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
Governments in developed countries commonly have policies to incentivize their firms’ 
cross-border activities aimed at penetrating untapped, high-growth markets. However, ISAs 
involving a new and unfamiliar local partner are inherently risky (Gulati, 1995). A history of 
fair and reliable processes between partners may be substituted in a new relationship by fair 
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initial negotiations and distribution of contributions and rewards. In this context, public 
policy makers should note that processes of allocating external funds to ISAs across their 
development stages can create perceived imbalances between the partners and obstruct trust 
building efforts. The findings show that amount of support is likely to influence local partner 
trust negatively; which is an issue for foreign governmental sponsors insofar as such actors 
are more remote from, and less visible to, them. Policy makers might derive advantage from 
accommodating the views of local alliance partners in their financial aid programs, and avoid 
approaches that initially favor the foreign alliance partner but preclude the development of a 
shared sense of trust with the local counterpart. 
Alliance managers interested in external support should consider how this could affect the 
dynamics of their relationships. In particular, amount of support is likely to influence 
negatively local partner trust, particularly in cases where the firms lack an alliance 
foreground characterized by substantive interactions and professional agreement 
underpinning the direction of the alliance and its work. One less than intuitive implication is 
that firms should not necessarily try to obtain the highest possible share of the funds. A 
second, more intuitively appealing implication is that distributive fairness should be explicitly 
addressed up front. This need not necessarily involve modifying distributions of the funds 
themselves, but could be limited to discussions aimed at developing a clear understanding of 
both partners’ task contributions in relation to the funds. Indeed, our results suggest 
interaction and agreement shield against unfavorable external intervention effects. 
Irrespective of the amount of support an ISA receives, the partner firms should maintain a 
focus on nurturing their relationship through intrinsically motivated activities that would be 
performed most effortlessly in the absence of support. 
 
LIMITATIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH 
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The present study focused on where prestudy interviews indicated we could most clearly 
understand the phenomenon of extrinsic motivation crowding out trust development. While 
we consider our focus on development aid support appropriate for this initial probing, it 
naturally restricts generalizability. Such a limitation necessitates future work on how trust 
development may be disrupted by external interventions that are not specifically financial or 
governmental. One option is to consider more complicated support scenarios in which foreign 
and/or local governmental sponsors provide economic and/or noneconomic incentives (Hu 
and Chen, 1996). It would also be advantageous for work on interventions to examine 
alliance partnerships nested within an ongoing consortium that involves other organizational 
actors’ interventions, and third-party ties in multilateral alliance projects (Tiwana, 2008; 
Heidl et al., 2014). Researchers might fruitfully investigate what happens to the partners’ 
intrinsic motivation and perceptions of what is considered fair and reliable when an alliance 
business experiences an unexpected resource gain from the network of one of the alliance 
partners (cf. Gopalakrishnan et al., 2008). 
A useful test of the robustness of motivation theory to changes in the model would involve 
studying effects of amount of support on other dependent variables that target alliance 
uncertainties. To this point, only 44 percent of our sample adopted formal equity alliance 
structues that come with greater safeguards suited to the risks of doing business in developing 
markets (cf. Gulati 1995). Future studies should investigate whether the particular form of 
external intervention affects ISA partners’ risk attitudes and crowds out work routines that 
develop structural as well as relational safeguards. 
Our treatment of moderation drew from theory (Rempel et al., 1985) suggesting trust 
expectations build through agreeable interactions that are participative during early 
cooperation processes. Notwithstanding our significant moderation findings, additional 
research is needed to understand wider circumstances that might condition external 
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intervention effects on process-based trust development in ISAs. For instance, the deleterious 
effects of external interventions on process-based trust in ISAs might be reinforced or offset 
by other forces from the institutional environment of developing economies, which are often 
tightly governed by sociopolitical institutions such as nongovernmental organizations, local 
community groups, and business organizations (Li and Zhang, 2007).  
A limitation of the study lies in that we assessed local partner trust using the foreign 
partner’s perception of this construct. In line with the trust literature (e.g., Fang et al., 2008; 
Zhong et al., 2014), this approach assumes trust in alliances possesses a characteristic of 
intraorganizational sharedness as partners continuously signal trust to their counterparts 
(Krishnan et al., 2015). Nonetheless, future research would benefit from also measuring trust 
at the local level despite the practical difficulties of doing so; surveying managers from 17 
developing countries in our case.  
Finally, while we limited ourselves to hypotheses about local partner trust, foreign partner 
trust may be influenced somewhat similarly. We refrained from developing this perspective 
as recent work demonstrating asymmetrical trust development (Korsgaard, Brower and 
Lester, 2014) suggests a need to develop hypotheses separately for local and foreign partner 
trust. We considered this too complex for the present study’s first probing of the phenomenon 
of interest. All the same, considering foreign partner trust, as well as the potential for trust 
asymmetry—that may or may not be linked to faultlines (cf. Heidl et al., 2014) concerning 
developed and developing country partners’ characteristics—seems a promising route to 
enhancing the richness of the theoretization.  
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Construct Standardized 
loadings
Avg. variance 
extracted
Composite 
reliability
Local partner trust 57% 0.79
Trust, ability-based (a) 0.68
Trust, benevolence-based (b) 0.67
Trust, integrity-based (c) 0.89
Resource similarities 53% 0.85
Similarities, financial resources (a) 0.63
Similarities, human resources (b) 0.92
Similarities, organizational resources (c) 0.78
Similarities, physical resources (d) 0.63
Similarities, technological resources (e) 0.65
Cultural similarities 79% 0.97
Similarities, values and beliefs (a) 1.00
Similarities, practices and behaviors (b) 0.71
Agreement 75% 0.90
Disagreement, tasks (reversed) (a) 0.93
Disagreement, process (reversed) (b) 0.89
Disagreement, goals (reversed) (c) 0.76
Interaction 79% 0.92
Participation, idea, local * Participation, idea, foreign (a) 0.92
Participation, planning, local * Participation, planning, foreign (b) 0.93
Participation, implementation, local * Participation, implementation, foreign (c) 0.81
Local partner participation 83% 0.94
Participation, idea, local (a) 0.87
Participation, planning, local (b) 0.95
Participation, implementation, local (c) 0.91
Foreign partner participation 77% 0.91
Participation, idea, foreign (a) 0.84
Participation, planning, foreign (b) 1.00
Participation, implementation, foreign (c) 0.77
Aid agency participation 85% 0.94
Participation, idea, aid agency (a) 0.86
Participation, planning, aid agency (b) 0.97
Participation, implementation, aid agency (c) 0.93
χ2(239)=269.94, p>0.05; RMSEA=0.03; NNFI=0.89
Table 1: Measurement model (n  = 105)
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Variables
H1 (-) Amount of support -0.23 ** -2.65 -0.32 ** -3.48***
H2 (-) Amount of support * interaction 0.23 * 2.21 **
H3 (+) Amount of support * agreement 0.22 * 2.31 **
Control variables
lnsiz_lp Local partner size 0.07 0.59 0.08 0.75 0.07 0.79
lnsiz_dp Foreign partner size -0.19 * -2.38 -0.17 * -2.10 -0.17 * -2.24
exp1 Local partner international experience -0.19 † -1.92 * -0.16 † -1.68 -0.14 -1.46
exp2 Local partner alliance experience -0.14 -1.35 -0.17 -1.65 -0.16 † -1.68 *
exp3 Foreign partner international experience 0.08 0.80 0.12 1.10 0.05 0.44
exp4 Foreign partner alliance experience 0.06 0.43 0.03 0.25 0.08 0.69
exp5 Prior experience working together 0.15 † 1.76 0.12 1.44 0.16 * 2.01
rel_1 Vertical relatedness 0.02 0.25 0.02 0.20 -0.03 -0.31
rel_2 Horizontal relatedness -0.04 -0.47 -0.01 -0.05 -0.04 -0.49
simres Resource similarities 0.15 1.64 0.16 † 1.80 0.13 1.52
simcult Cultural similarity -0.02 -0.21 0.01 0.11 0.02 0.28
form_2 Equity alliance -0.03 -0.35 0.04 0.43 -0.07 -0.81
nat_1 Local to foreign sales 0.13 1.55 0.09 1.09 0.13 1.54
nat_2 Foreign to local sales -0.09 -1.01 -0.12 -1.38 -0.06 -0.78
nat_3 Joint selling in local market 0.16 1.31 0.12 1.09 0.09 0.98
nat_4 Joint selling in non-local market -0.08 -1.05 -0.11 -1.41 -0.12 -1.61
Interaction 0.20 * 2.35 ** 0.21 * 2.43 0.20 * 2.46 **
invjoi Agreement 0.09 0.85 0.09 0.88 0.09 1.06
invlp Local partner participation 0.13 1.19 0.14 1.29 0.21 * 2.03 **
invdp Foreign partner participation 0.18 † 1.92 * 0.20 * 2.29 0.29 ** 3.60***
invdan Aid agency participation -0.35 ** -3.67 -0.30 ** -3.22 -0.36 ** -3.92
n 105 105 105
R
2 
0.33 0.37 0.44
Adjusted R
2 
0.16 0.21 0.27
df 21 22 24
F 1.95 * *** 2.23 ** *** 2.61 ** ***
†p <0.10; *p<0.05; **p<0.01
Table 3: Ordinary least squares moderated hierarchical regression analysis (n = 105)
Local partner trust
Model a Model b Model c
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Figure 1: Interaction and agreement as moderators of the relationship between amount of support and local partner trust 
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Variables
lnsiz_lp Local partner size 0.06 0.58
lnsiz_dp Foreign partner size 0.03 0.32
exp1 Local partner international experience 0.11 0.92 ***
exp2 Local partner alliance experience -0.12 -1.01 ***
exp3 Foreign partner international experience 0.15 1.40 ***
exp4 Foreign partner alliance experience -0.11 -1.17 ***
exp5 Prior experience working together -0.11 -1.36
rel_1 Vertical relatedness 0.01 0.06
rel_2 Horizontal relatedness 0.17 1.63
simres Resource similarities 0.05 0.38
simcult Cultural similarity 0.11 1.35 ***
form_2 Equity alliance 0.27 * 2.51
nat_1 Local to foreign sales -0.12 -1.32
nat_2 Foreign to local sales -0.08 -0.79
nat_3 Joint selling in local market -0.11 -1.00
nat_4 Joint selling in non-local market -0.16 -1.49
H1 (-) Amount of support -0.39 † -1.72
H2 (-) Amount of support * interaction 0.19 * 2.21
H3 (+) Amount of support * agreement 0.27 * 2.59
conft3 Interaction *** 0.25 ** 3.03 ***
invjoi Agreement *** 0.11 1.12
invlp Local partner participation *** 0.20 † 1.86 *
invdp Foreign partner participation *** 0.28 ** 3.04 ***
invdan Aid agency participation -0.27 ** -2.80
First-stage residuals 0.05 0.20
First-stage residuals * amount of support 0.00 0.03
n 105 105
R
2 
0.15 0.29
Adjusted R
2 
-0.01 0.22
df 16 10
F 0.94 *** 3.91 ** ***
†p <0.10; *p<0.05; **p<0.01
Table 4: Regression analysis following Garen's approach for selectivity-bias correction with a 
continuous choice variable (n = 105)
Local partner trust
Second-stage 
model
Amount of support
First-stage 
model
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APPENDIX  
In the survey respondents were asked to relate their answers to an alliance partnership 
supported through Danida’s B2B Program. Where the respondent’s firm participated in more 
than one relevant alliance, they were asked to select the alliance of which they were most 
knowledgeable. The numbers correspond to the numbers in the correlation matrix presented 
in Table 2. The letters in multi-item measures correspond to the items in Table 1. All 
measures, except for Amount of support, were obtained through the survey. 
1) Local partner trust (from (1) ‘strongly disagree’ to (5) ‘strongly agree’) 
a) The local partner has trusted that the Danish partner had the skills and abilities needed 
in the partnership 
b) The local partner has trusted that the Danish partner was concerned about the well-
being of the local partner 
c) The local partner has trusted that the Danish partner followed moral and principles 
that the local partner finds acceptable 
 
2) Amount of support: information obtained from Danida 
 
3) Local partner size: logarithm of local partner employees at the start of the project 
 
4) Foreign partner size: logarithm of local partner employees at the start of the project 
 
5) Local partner international experience (from (1) ‘strongly disagree’ to (5) ‘strongly 
agree’) 
At the beginning of the partnership the local partner had considerable partnership/alliance 
experience 
 
6) Local partner alliance experience (from (1) ‘strongly disagree’ to (5) ‘strongly agree’) 
At the beginning of the partnership the local partner had considerable partnership/alliance 
experience 
 
7) Foreign partner international experience (from (1) ‘strongly disagree’ to (5) ‘strongly 
agree’) 
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At the beginning of the partnership the Danish partner had considerable 
partnership/alliance experience 
 
8) Foreign partner alliance experience (from (1) ‘strongly disagree’ to (5) ‘strongly agree’) 
At the beginning of the partnership the Danish partner had considerable 
partnership/alliance experience 
 
9) Prior experience working together (from (1) ‘strongly disagree’ to (5) ‘strongly agree’) 
At the beginning of the partnership the partners had considerable experience doing 
business with each other 
 
10) Vertical relatedness (from (1) ‘strongly disagree’ to (5) ‘strongly agree’) 
From the beginning of the partnership the local partner and the Danish partner have been 
related vertically (i.e. the local partner could use the Danish partner's outputs as inputs or 
vice versa) 
 
11) Horizontal relatedness (from (1) ‘strongly disagree’ to (5) ‘strongly agree’) 
From the beginning of the partnership the local partner and the Danish partner have been 
related horizontally (i.e. operated in the same industry or shared significant amounts of 
inputs, competencies and/or customers) 
 
12) Resource similarities (from (1) ‘strongly disagree’ to (5) ‘strongly agree’) 
a) From the beginning of the partnership the local partner and the Danish partner have 
had similar financial resources (e.g. cash flows and debt capacity) 
b) From the beginning of the partnership the local partner and the Danish partner have 
had similar human resources (e.g. management and staff skills and competencies) 
c) From the beginning of the partnership the local partner and the Danish partner have 
had similar organizational resources (e.g. systems and routines) 
d) From the beginning of the partnership the local partner and the Danish partner have 
had similar physical resources (e.g. buildings and equipment) 
e) From the beginning of the partnership the local partner and the Danish partner have 
had similar technological resources (e.g. ability to produce high quality 
products/services) 
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13) Cultural similarity (from (1) ‘strongly disagree’ to (5) ‘strongly agree’) 
a) From the beginning of the partnership the local partner and the Danish partner have 
had similar values and beliefs 
b) From the beginning of the partnership the local partner and the Danish partner have 
had similar practices and behaviours 
 
14) Equity alliance (coded 1 if answer to question below was 2, 0 if not): 
Please indicate which of the following best describes the most recent form of the 
partnership?    
1) The Danish partner bought a shareholding in the local partner 
2) A separate company was established in which both the local partner and the Danish 
partner bought a shareholding 
3) No separate company was established and the Danish partner bought no shareholding 
in the local partner 
4) No answer applies 
 
15) Local to foreign sales (from (1) ‘strongly disagree’ to (5) ‘strongly agree’) 
The local partner should sell products or services to the Danish partner 
 
16) Foreign to local sales (from (1) ‘strongly disagree’ to (5) ‘strongly agree’) 
The Danish partner should sell products or services to the local partner 
 
17) Joint selling in local market (from (1) ‘strongly disagree’ to (5) ‘strongly agree’) 
The partners should join forces and sell products or services to the local market jointly 
 
18) Joint selling in non-local market (from (1) ‘strongly disagree’ to (5) ‘strongly agree’) 
The partners should join forces and sell products or services to the Danish or other non-
local markets jointly 
 
19) Interaction (from (1) ‘strongly disagree’ to (5) ‘strongly agree’) 
a) The local (Danish) partner has participated actively in the development of the basic 
idea 
b) The local (Danish) partner has participated actively in the planning done to transform 
the basic idea into an actual plan 
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c) The local (Danish) partner has participated actively in the implementation done to 
transform the plan into action 
 
20) Agreement (from (1) ‘strongly disagree’ to (5) ‘strongly agree’) 
a) The local partner and the Danish partner have had professional disagreements about 
which activities and tasks should be performed [reverse-coded] 
b) The local partner and the Danish partner have had professional disagreements about 
which partner should perform given tasks [reverse-coded] 
c) The local partner and the Danish partner have had professional disagreements 
regarding the goals of the partnership [reverse-coded] 
 
21) Local partner participation (from (1) ‘strongly disagree’ to (5) ‘strongly agree’) 
a) The local partner has participated actively in the development of the basic idea 
b) The local partner has participated actively in the planning done to transform the basic 
idea into an actual plan 
c) The local partner has participated actively in the implementation done to transform 
the plan into action 
 
22) Foreign partner participation (from (1) ‘strongly disagree’ to (5) ‘strongly agree’) 
a) The Danish partner has participated actively in the development of the basic idea 
b) The Danish partner has participated actively in the planning done to transform the 
basic idea into an actual plan 
c) The Danish partner has participated actively in the implementation done to transform 
the plan into action 
 
23) Aid agency participation (from (1) ‘strongly disagree’ to (5) ‘strongly agree’) 
a) Danida has participated actively in the development of the basic idea 
b) Danida has participated actively in the planning done to transform the basic idea into 
an actual plan 
c) Danida has participated actively in the implementation done to transform the plan into 
action 
